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ABSTRACT
With the recent passage of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), a federal civil cause of action for
trade secret misappropriation is now available. To add some familiarity to the Act, the drafters
incorporated definitions similar to those of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). However, even
though the provisions may seem familiar, there is a new requirement that is not obvious on the face
of the statute- the plausibility requirement for pleading under the federal rules. To understand
plausibility; however, one must understand the DTSA. Unfortunately, there is no guidance from the
DTSA that can aid interpretation of the statutory definitions for this purpose. Due to the similarities
with the UTSA; however, there is some persuasive guidance in the UTSA comments and in federal
cases applying state UTSAs. This article reviews these options as a means of navigating the federal
plausibility requirement in DTSA actions.
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PLAUSIBILITY UNDER THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT
MICHELLE EVANS*
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 11, 2016, President Obama signed the Defend Trade Secrets Act
(“DTSA”).1 This Act amended the Economic Espionage Act to create a federal civil
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. 2 To add some familiarity to the text
of the Act, the drafters incorporated definitions similar to those of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (“UTSA”), an act adopted by the majority of states. However, practitioners
lulled into this familiarity and not accustomed to federal practice must be cautious
when pleading trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA in federal court. It is in
federal court where one must be familiar with the plausibility requirement for
pleading.
In order to navigate the plausibility requirement, one must first have an
understanding of how the DTSA is to be applied. Unfortunately, there is no guidance
from the new statute that can aid a full interpretation of the multi-component
definitions found in the DTSA for purposes of satisfying the plausibility requirement.
Due to the similarities with the UTSA, however, there is some persuasive guidance in
the UTSA comments and in federal cases applying state UTSAs. Therefore, this article
reviews these options as a means of navigating the federal plausibility requirement in
DTSA actions.3
II. THE NEW DTSA
The movement to create a federal civil cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation has been around a long time. 4 Prior to enactment of the DTSA, a
litigant could bring a civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation in federal
court, but only if it was a diversity case applying a state trade secret law. This was
problematic because of the lack of uniformity in state law. Although the majority of
states have adopted the UTSA, more than half of the states elected to modify the
statute in some form.5
While uniformity was a goal with the DTSA, a period of unpredictability is
expected. However, this period of unpredictability is not expected to be too long since
© Michelle Evans 2017. J.D., Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Texas State University.
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376.
2 Id.
3 This article is also useful for legal studies instructors.
For a case study illustrating a
hypothetical company’s efforts to protect its secrets according to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act that
can be used equally well to introduce students to the new DTSA, see generally Michelle Evans, Trade
Secrets in the Legal Studies Curriculum- A Case Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 1 (2012).
4 For further discussion of the movement to federalize trade secret law, see generally Marina
Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633 (1998); Rebel
J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427 (1995).
5 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538–39 (2005).
*
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the DTSA is based, in part, on the UTSA. Therefore, comments to the UTSA can act
as a guide for interpretation. In addition, courts may also look to other federal court
interpretations of individual state UTSAs. 6 These cases can be used as persuasive
authority while federal courts begin to apply the DTSA. 7 This persuasive authority
will be particularly useful in determining what satisfies the plausibility requirement
in federal DTSA cases. The next section looks at the plausibility requirement in more
detail.
III. RULE 8 AND THE PLAUSIBILITY REQUIREMENT
Like all federal civil causes of action, pleadings alleging trade misappropriation
under the DTSA must satisfy the plausibility requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.8 According to Rule 8(a)(2), “a pleading that states a claim for
relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”9 If the alleged misappropriator believes the pleadings do not
satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), the alleged misappropriator can file a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
The leading United States Supreme Court case that set the stage for the pleading
requirements was Conley v. Gibson.10 In Conley, the Court concluded “the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim.”11 Instead, “all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 12 Applying this standard, the Court
concluded that the complaint alleging violation of the Railway Labor Act did
adequately set forth a claim and provided fair notice.13
The interpretation by the Court in Conley, however, was insufficient, and if
applied literally, “a wholly conclusory statement of a claim would survive a motion to
dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later

6 For a list of statutory citations for states that have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, see
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT Refs & Annos, 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005).
7 For further discussion of some of these state specific Uniform Trade Secrets Acts, see generally
Brandon B. Cate, Saforo & Associates, Inc. v. Porocel Corp.: The Failure of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act to Clarify the Doubtful and Confused Status of Common Law Trade Secret Principles, 53 ARK. L.
REV. 687 (2000); Michelle Evans, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act Makes Its Way to Texas, 23 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 25 (2014); Douglas F. Halijan, The Past, Present, And Future Of Trade Secrets Law
in Tennessee: A Practitioner’s Guide Following The Enactment of The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 32
U. MEM. L. REV. 1 (2001); Robert W. Kiesnowski, Jr., Trade Secrets, Duties of Confidentiality, and
Misappropriation Claims under the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 37 COLO. LAW. 81 (2008); C.
Geoffrey Weirich & Daniel. P. Hart, Protecting Trade Secrets and Confidential Information in Georgia,
60 MERCER L. REV. 533 (2009).
8 For further discussion of the federal plausibility requirement, see generally Richard J.R.
Raleigh Jr. & Marcus A. Huffa, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: A Review of the “Plausibility” Pleading
Standard, FED. LAW., Sept. 2008, at 32.
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
10 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
11 Id. at 47.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 48.
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establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.”14 To close this loophole,
Rule 8 was reinterpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly.15 In Twombly, the Court clarified that a complaint does not require detailed
factual allegations, but it must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”16 Heightened fact pleading
of specifics is not required, “but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”17 This requirement of plausibility does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage, but “simply calls for enough fact[s] to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim element].” 18
Two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court confirmed
that the Twombly plausibility requirement applied to all civil cases. 19 Unfortunately,
neither Twombly nor Iqbal provided much guidance on what specifically satisfied the
plausibility requirement and therefore interpretation for future cases had to be made
on a case by case basis. However, almost a decade later, a level of predictability has
emerged from federal cases applying state UTSAs. This line of cases can be useful to
practitioners attempting to satisfy the plausibility requirement for purposes of the
DTSA. The next section looks at the plausibility requirement in relation to trade secret
status.
IV. PLEADING TRADE SECRET STATUS UNDER THE DTSA
A. In General
When attempting to satisfy the plausibility requirement for the DTSA, one must
first consider the trade secret status allegation. Under Twombly, plausibility requires
“more than labels and conclusions.”20 Thus, the plaintiff cannot simply state that a
trade secret was involved, but instead must clearly identify and describe the trade
secret in question.21 Under the DTSA, a trade secret is defined as “all forms and types
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007).
Id. at 544.
16 Id. at 555.
17 Id. at 570.
18 Id. at 556.
19 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
20 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
21 See, e.g., DLC DermaCare LLC v. Castillo, No. CV–10–333–PHX–DGC, 2010 WL 5148073, *4
(D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2010) (pleading information that covers “virtually every aspect to operate and
manage DermaCare clinics and master regional franchises, including pre-opening items, advertising
and marketing, use of Dermacare’s treatments and products, management, human resources and
payroll, accounting and financial reporting, front office administration, computer and software
utilization, and risk management” was sufficient under the UTSA); Events Media Network, Inc. v.
Weather Channel Interactive, Inc., Civil No. 1:13–03 (RBK/AMD), 2013 WL 3658823, *3 (D. N.J. July
12, 2013) (identifying the trade secret as a database that compiles information for schedules and
related information for various local and national events was sufficient for the UTSA claim); Council
for Educ. Travel, USA v. Czopek, Civil No. 1:11–CV–00672, 2011 WL 3882474, *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 2,
2011) (identifying trade secrets as strategic business and marketing plans, computer programs and
codes, client lists and information regarding client accounts, employee rosters and compensation
terms was sufficient to satisfy the plausibility requirement for the UTSA claim); AWP, Inc. v.
14
15
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of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information,
including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs,
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether
tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if (A) the owner
thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the
information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by,
another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the
information.”22
This definition, however, is slightly different from that of the UTSA definition.
Specifically, the UTSA preamble of potentially protectable items does not include as
many types as that of the DTSA.23 However, classification in the preamble is just one
factor to consider for determining the trade secret status. Aside from these
modifications to the preamble, the requirements under parts (A) and (B) of the DTSA
definition substantively follow the language used in the UTSA.24 Therefore, for
purposes of satisfying the plausibility requirement for trade secret status under the
DTSA, both the UTSA comments25 and federal decisions determining plausibility for
purposes of state UTSA claims can be useful.
Federal decisions determining plausibility of trade secret status allegations for
purposes of state UTSA claims require the trade secret owner to describe “the subject
matter of the trade secret with sufficient particularity to separate it from matters of
general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons . . . skilled in
the trade.”26 This can include identifying the trade secret in relation to a specific
Commonwealth Excavating, Inc., Civil Action No. 5:13cv031, 2013 WL 3830500, *5 (W.D. Va. July 24,
2013) (concluding the plaintiff sufficiently identified its trade secrets as “the identities of its
customers, particular needs and issues of its customers, and protocols and methodologies for traffic
control”).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2016).
23 The UTSA preamble to the trade secret definition provides for “information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program device, method, technique, or process.” See UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
24 See id.
(The UTSA trade secret definition provides that the information “(i) derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.”).
25 Id. § 1 cmt.
26 Compare Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Rezente, No. CIV. 2:10–1704 WBS KJM, 2010 WL
5129293, *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010) (alleging the trade secrets were “the [plaintiff’s] books and records,
the confidential customer list and account information contained therein, including the identity of
[plaintiff’s] customers, their names and addresses, agents and account managers, business and
financial dealings, the transactions in their [plaintiff] accounts, purchase requirements, purchasing
history and patterns, servicing terms and conditions, lease agreement lengths, expirations, and terms,
equipment configurations, customer plans, preferences, and communicated needs, interconnectivity
opportunities, profitability considerations, [plaintiff’s] strengths and weaknesses with its customers,
and other business and financial information concerning [plaintiff’s] products, prices, pricing
schedules, profitability considerations, marketing strategies, leasing terms, vendors, costs, training
techniques, distribution and delivery systems, and/or other market considerations” was sufficient)
with Am. Registry, LLC v. Hanaw, No. 2:13–cv–352–FtM–29UAM, 2013 WL 6332971, *3-*4 (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 5, 2013) (alleging that the defendants misappropriated “customer lists, customer identity,
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product.27 However, the plausibility requirement is not so broad as to require a
detailed disclosure of the actual trade secret. 28
In addition, Twombly requires “more than . . . a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.”29 This applies equally to the sub-elements of a cause of
action. When considering the trade secret element to the misappropriation cause of
action, the plaintiff must address the specific sub-elements of the trade secret
definition.30 However, reciting the statutory definition alone is insufficient. 31 In
addition, ignoring a substantial portion of the trade secret definition will not suffice.32
The specific sub-elements to the DTSA trade secret definition require that the trade
secret information (1) have independent economic value, actual or potential; (2) not be
generally known to another person who would benefit from it; (3) not be readily
ascertainable through proper means; and (4) be the subject of reasonable measures to

customer contact information and confidential information about each customer’s business, purchase
and credit information, sales and operation procedures, software, system architecture, financial data,
sales and marketing strategies and data, lists, statistics, programs, research, development, employee,
personnel and contractor data, information and records, and information relating to products offered”
by plaintiff was so broad that it was meaningless) and Medafor, Inc. v. Starch Med. Inc., No. 09–CV–
0441 PJS/FLN, 2009 WL 2163580, *1 (D. Minn. July 16, 2009) (identifying trade secrets as “business
methodologies, formulas, devices, and compilations of information, including suppliers and customers”
was too broad).
27 See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co. v. AlphaPet Inc., Civ. Action No. 09–971–LPS–CJB, 2011 WL
5402767, *5 (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2011) (identifying the trade secret as “confidential, proprietary, and trade
secret information relating to the manufacture of PET, including information related to Eastman’s
IntegRex™ PET technology” was sufficient even though the trade secret owner also used the phrase
“including information related to Eastman’s IntegRex™ PET technology” throughout the complaint
which suggested that there could be some other unidentified trade secrets); TE Connectivity
Networks, Inc. v. All Sys. Broadband, Inc., Civil No. 13–1356 ADM/FLN, 2013 WL 6827348, *4 (D.
Minn. Dec. 26, 2013) (identifying the product and the specifics of each product such as “technical
specifications, design parameters, performance criteria, and testing data” was sufficient); Wilcox
Indus. Corp. v. Hansen, 870 F. Supp. 2d 296, 309 (D.N.H. 2012) (concluding the trade secret owner
sufficiently identified its trade secrets where the design specifications, materials specifications,
information relating to the development of parts and components, information relating to the
manufacturing and assembly processes, customer information, marketing strategies, and details of
contracts and communications with current and prospective customers were tied to one specific
product).
28 See, e.g., Joshua David Mellberg LLC v. Will, 96 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964 (D. Ariz. 2015) (alleging
the trade secret information included training materials, confidential client and marketing lists,
advertising data, call center metrics, proprietary sales processes, metrics, and scripts, sales and
marketing programs, advertising copy still in development, and password protected training and
educational videos was sufficient).
29 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
30 See, e.g., Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 2010 WL 5129293, at *2; EndoSurg Med., Inc. v.
EndoMaster Med., Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 525, 547 (D. Md. 2014).
31 See, e.g., Pellerin v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988-989 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
32 See, e.g., Hot Stuff Foods, LLC v. Dornbach, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1044 (D. Minn. 2010)
(concluding the plaintiff failed to adequately establish trade secret status in the complaint where there
were no facts to support several sub-elements, even though the plaintiff alleged that when the former
employee resigned, he allegedly copied company’s confidential business plans, pricing, margins, and
sales strategies).
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maintain secrecy.33 The trade secret owner should be prepared to plead each of these
sub-elements for plausibility purposes. 34
B. Pleading Independent Economic Value, Actual or Potential
The definition of a trade secret under the DTSA includes a requirement that the
information “derives independent economic value, actual or potential.” 35 This subelement is the same in the UTSA definition. Under either application, in order to
establish trade secret status, the trade secret owner must have some idea of the
information’s value.36 Looking to federal cases applying state UTSAs, it can be
important to show that the information is valuable to competitors37 or that others,
including the alleged misappropriator, would pay money for the information. 38 In
33 See Michelle Evans, Determining What Constitutes a Trade Secret Under the New Texas
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA), 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 469, 477 (2014) (discussing four factors to
the UTSA definition, providing that the “information (1) must have independent economic value,
actual or potential; (2) must not be generally known to other persons who would benefit from it; (3)
must not be readily ascertainable by proper means; and (4) must be the subject of reasonable efforts
to maintain its secrecy”); Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277,
285 (1980) (discussing three factors to the UTSA definition, including that the trade secret “(1) be
information; (2) have actual or potential ‘independent economic value’ stemming from its secrecy; and
(3) have been the object of reasonable efforts designed to maintain its secrecy”).
34 See, e.g., Apex Tool Grp., LLC v. DMTCO, LLC, No. 3:13–cv–372, 2014 WL 6748344, *13 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 25, 2014) (alleging (1) the product line was established in 1929, (2) years of financial
investment and product development, invention, testing, and design went into making the product,
(3) the product line was sufficient and a widely recognized brand in the industry, and (4)
confidentiality agreements and company policies addressing information secrecy used was sufficient);
AWP, Inc. v. Commonwealth Excavating, Inc., Civil Action No. 5:13cv031, 2013 WL 3830500, *5 (W.D.
Va. July 24, 2013) (alleging that (1) the plaintiff took efforts maintain secrecy by limiting the number
of employees that had access to the trade secrets and by maintaining customer information and pricing
at the local level in order to minimize distribution of the information among plaintiff’s employees, (2)
it derived economic value from the information not being generally known to other persons, and (3)
the disclosure of the information would damage plaintiff’s business and financial interests, as well as
its experience, goodwill, and reputation with its customers was sufficient); Radiator Express
Warehouse, Inc. v. Shie, 708 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (concluding the plaintiff set forth
a plausible claim that trade secrets were involved where the information was “highly sensitive and
valuable to [the plaintiff], as it included internal documents discussing [plaintiff’s] core business
strategies, customer lists that contained a host of information about . . . customers, including their
buying preferences, and [the plaintiff’s] manuals on how to run a . . . warehouse, all information that
could only be accessed by a few privileged individuals and the information was disclosed in a meeting
to two employees . . . who agreed to maintain the secrecy of the information”).
35 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2016).
36 See generally R. Mark Halligan & Richard F. Weyand, The Economic Valuation of Trade Secret
Assets, J. INTERNET L., Feb. 2006, at 19 (discussing property valuation methods).
37 See, e.g., EndoSurg Med., Inc. v. EndoMaster Med., Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 525, 546 (D. Md. 2014).
38 See, e.g., Myung Ga, Inc. v. Myung Ga of MD, Inc., Civil Action No. DKC 10–3464, 2011 WL
3476828, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2011) (concluding plausibility as to the value allegation where the
complaint asserted that plaintiff’s previous licensing agreements indicated the “secret and marketable
nature” of the recipes and plaintiff was “in the business of developing and licensing Korean food
recipes and marketing material”); Events Media Network, Inc. v. Weather Channel Interactive, Inc.,
Civil No. 1:13–03 (RBK/AMD), 2013 WL 3658823, at *3 (D. N.J. July 12, 2013) (concluding plausibility
on a claim that the database had value, even though the database compiled publicly available
information, where the plaintiff asserted the database was not made available to the public or its
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addition, trade secret owners have been successful establishing this sub-element
where the value is tied to the time, effort, and expense the owner expended in
developing the trade secret.39
C. Pleading not Generally Known to Another Person
The DTSA also requires that the trade secret information not be “generally known
to . . . another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the
information.”40 There is only one minor difference between this definition and that of
the UTSA definition, using “another person” instead of “other persons,” but these subelements are substantively the same.41 Hence, the UTSA comments and federal cases
applying state UTSAs can be helpful.
One aspect of the DTSA sub-element to consider is how “another person” will be
construed. Looking to the UTSA for guidance in its interpretation of “other persons”,
the comments offer some suggestions. The UTSA comments state that these “other
persons” do not have to be the general public for trade secret status to be lost. 42
Information generally loses its trade secret status if it becomes public knowledge. 43
This includes disclosures to government agencies once the information is publicly
available44 and disclosures on the Internet.45
The UTSA comments clarify that if the persons who can obtain an “economic
benefit” from it are aware of it, then trade secret status can be lost.46 Unfortunately,
the phrase “economic benefit” is not defined in the comments. Some federal courts
applying state UTSAs have limited this interpretation of “other persons” to the
defendant or other competitors, and not applied this to the general public.47 In some
jurisdictions, it is enough if the information is generally known within the trade or

competitors, and that it derived economic value from the database by licensing it to others on a limited
basis).
39 See, e.g., Instant Tech., LLC v. DeFazio, No. 12 C 491, 2012 WL 2567033, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June,
26, 2012) (alleging that the confidential information was the “product of hundreds of hours of work,”
was “developed at a substantial cost . . . deriv[ing] economic value,” and “cannot be independently
developed by its competitors without great effort and expense” was sufficient); Alpha Pro Tech, Inc. v.
VWR Int’l LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 425, 436-437 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (alleging that the plaintiff “ex[p]ended
significant time, effort, and expense to develop [these] proprietary formulations and methods” and its
trade secret methods had “value . . . to the company and its competitors” was sufficient for plausibility
of the value claim).
40 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2016).
41 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
42 Id. § 1 cmt.
43 See, e.g., Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
44 See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. GI Dynamics, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 883, 899 (D. Ariz.
2012); Giasson Aerospace Sci., Inc. v. RCO Eng’g, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 830, 841 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
45 For further discussion of trade secrets and the Internet, see generally Elizabeth A. Rowe,
Saving Trade Secret Disclosures On the Internet: Through Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1 (2007); Ryan Lambrecht, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure
in the Information Age?, 18 REV. LITIG. 317 (1999).
46 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
47 See, e.g., Brigham Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1326 (D. Utah 2012).
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business.48 Therefore, the trade secret owner should be prepared to show that the
trade secret information was not disclosed to members of the public or to those in the
trade.49 There may be limited instances in which the trade secret owner must disclose
the information to someone with whom the trade secret owner does business. 50
However, if this becomes necessary, the plaintiff should be prepared to show that
confidentiality restrictions were in place.51
D. Pleading Readily Ascertainable by Proper Means
The DTSA further provides that the trade secret information not be “readily
ascertainable through proper means.”52 Unfortunately, the DTSA provides no
definition for “proper means”53 or “readily ascertainable.” Again, due to the
similarities with the UTSA sub-element, the UTSA comments and federal cases
applying state UTSAs can be helpful.
According to the UTSA comments, proper means includes “discovery by
independent invention, reverse engineering, under license, from public observation, or
from published literature.”54 The comments to Section 1 of the UTSA further provide
that “information is readily ascertainable if it is available in trade journals, reference
books, or published materials.”55 When the alleged trade secret information can be

48 See, e.g., CDI Energy Servs., Inc. v. West River Pumps, Inc., 567 F.3d 398, 402 (8th Cir. 2009)
(concluding a customer list was not protectable as a trade secret where the potential customers were
a small group of easily identifiable locally operated oilfield companies and could easily be attainable
by those in the local oilfield service and equipment industry); Softchoice Corp. v. MacKenzie, 636 F.
Supp. 2d 927, 937 (D. Neb. 2009).
49 See, e.g., IDT Corp. v. Unlimited Recharge, Inc., Civil Action No. 11–4992 (ES), 2012 WL
4050298, at *6 (D. N.J. Sept. 13, 2012) (concluding the plaintiff adequately alleged that the trade
secret information was not generally known where the complaint provided that the information was
not obvious from the existing public information or from the product as marketed and was not general
or basic information known to the industry).
50 For further discussion of disclosures to outsiders, see generally Thomas J. Oppold, Top 10
Ways to Help Protect Your Franchise’s Trade Secrets, 35 FRANCHISING WORLD 57 (2003); Thomas J.
Scott, Jr. & Eleanor M. Hynes, Reducing Your Risk as a Licensor or Licensee in Patent and Technology
Licensing-The Important Terms to Consider, 28 LICENSING J. 6 (2008).
51 See, e.g., Marc Maghsoudi Enters., Inc. v. Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc., No. 08 C
441, 2009 WL 3837455, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2009) (concluding that disclosure of the buyer’s
customer list to the seller extinguished any trade secret protection for the list where the disclosure
was made without any agreement of confidentiality).
52 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2016).
53 “Improper means” is defined. See infra Part VB.
54 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
55 Id.
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derived from available sources then the plaintiff’s trade secret claim may be
dismissed.56 This is especially true if the information is published on the Internet.57
However, federal case law applying state UTSAs suggests there is an exception
when available sources are insufficient to develop the information in question without
a significant expenditure of time, effort and expense. 58 Furthermore, the fact that
some or all of the aspects of the trade secret information are generally known does not
automatically preclude trade secret protection for information that combines the
various aspects, particularly where there is a competitive advantage. 59 But, this must
be clear in the pleadings in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 60
E. Pleading Reasonable Measures to Maintain Secrecy
The final requirement for the trade secret definition under the DTSA is that the
trade secret owner “has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret.”61
This sub-element is substantively similar to the UTSA definition. 62 Therefore, the
UTSA comments and federal cases applying state UTSAs can be helpful.
According to federal case law applying individual state UTSAs, the more efforts
pled by the trade secret owner, the greater likelihood the owner will be able to support
a plausible claim for trade secret misappropriation.63 The primary question in these
56 See, e.g., Cablecom Tax Servs., Inc. v. Shenandoah Telecomms. Co., Civil Action No. 5:12cv069,
2013 WL 2382969, at *5 (W.D. Va. May 30, 2013) (concluding the plaintiff’s trade secret claim,
specifically to applying tax laws and regulations to customer financial information and negotiating
property tax discounts with tax officials, was implausible where property tax laws and regulations
and identities of local tax officials are reasonably ascertainable by proper means); McKay Consulting,
Inc. v. Rockingham Mem’l Hosp., 665 F. Supp. 2d 626, 635 (W.D. Va. 2009) (concluding the plaintiff’s
alleged trade secret information, specifically advice based on an understanding of various published
laws and regulation, was readily ascertainable and could have been independently formulated by
others in the industry).
57 For further discussion of trade secrets and the Internet, see generally Elizabeth A. Rowe,
Saving Trade Secret Disclosures On the Internet: Through Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1 (2007); Ryan Lambrecht, Note, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for
Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18 REV. LITIG. 317 (1999).
58 See, e.g., Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL, 742 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1026 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
59 See, e.g., Haggard v. Spine, Civil Action No. 09–cv–00721–CMA–KMT, 2009 WL 1655030, *7
(D. Colo. June 12, 2009) (alleging that an outsider could not develop the same type of information
about the customers in the territory from a phone book or website alone was sufficient even though
the information could be obtained from public sources like a phone book or the internet).
60 See Edgenet, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 2d at 1026 (alleging the information contained taxonomy
categories that organized the otherwise potentially public data in particular ways and that this
compilation would not be possible to create without extensive effort and money, and that even then,
the result would be a “version” of the documents, not the exact same configuration was sufficient to
claim the information was not readily ascertainable by proper means).
61 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2016).
62 The information “is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
63 Compare Cosmetic Alchemy, LLC v. R & G, LLC, No. CV–10–1222–PHX–GMS, 2010 WL
4777553, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 17, 2010) (concluding the pleading lacked any facts that would allow the
Court to infer that reasonable efforts were made to maintain the secrecy of the information) with
Vesta Corp. v. Amdocs Mgmt. Ltd., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1166 (D. Or. 2015) (alleging that the plaintiff
had required competitors who sought acquisition of plaintiff’s company to sign nondisclosure
agreements, both initially and upon entry of the plaintiff’s facilities, and that it maintained locked
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federal cases applying individual state UTSAs is what is “reasonable”.64 Intending to
keep information a secret is not enough. Reasonable measures can include, but are
not limited to, the following: limiting access to the information on a need-to-know
basis;65 restricting access, such as with controlled access doors or computer network
restrictions;66 using and enforcing computer passwords; and using confidentiality
agreements or verbal instructions for confidentiality.67
In federal case law interpreting state UTSAs, the obligation of confidentiality
appears to be the most important consideration for determining whether the trade
secret owner used reasonable efforts to protect its trade secret, and this importance is
reflected in the plausible pleading requirements. 68 Stating a plausible claim for trade
secret misappropriation can require the trade secret owner to allege that any third
party who received disclosure of the trade secret information was under either an
express or implied duty to keep the information confidential. 69 An express duty

facilities, computers, and networks in an effort to prevent unauthorized disclosure of secrets related
to services it provided to mobile phone network operators was sufficient to make a plausible claim for
reasonable measures) and T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Huawei Device USA, Inc., No. C14–1351RAJ, 2015
WL 4308682, *6 (W.D. Wash. July 14, 2015) (concluding the trade secret owner sufficiently alleged
that reasonable efforts were made where the plaintiff limited access to its clean room, which contained
the trade secret product, monitored what occurred in the clean room, and immediately addressed the
defendant’s alleged theft of information from the clean room) and Edgenet, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 2d at
1028 (alleging that the plaintiff contracted with both retailers and suppliers to collect and provide
data, that clients were required to sign confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements, and clients
were only permitted limited access were sufficient to allege reasonable efforts were made, even though
the plaintiff alleged that it shared some of the information with customers and suppliers).
64 For further discussion about what is “reasonable,” see generally Jermaine S. Grubbs, Give The
Little Guys Equal Opportunity At Trade Secret Protection: Why The “Reasonable Efforts” Taken By
Small Businesses Should be Analyzed Less Stringently, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 421 (2005).
65 See, e.g., UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., 675 F. Supp. 2d 854, 867 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(finding no trade secret status where, among other factors, the list was not stored in a secure location
and treated as a trade secret).
66 See, e.g., Pyro Spectaculars N., Inc. v. Souza, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
(concluding reasonable efforts were made by the plaintiff to protect its customer list where, among
other things, the plaintiff compartmentalized data and limited access by geographic region and job
function).
67 Id.; but see Liberty Centrifugal Acquisition Corp., Inc. v. Moon, 849 F. Supp. 2d 814, 832-833
(E.D. Wis. 2012).
68 See, e.g., Telogis, Inc. v. InSight Mobile Data, Inc., No. PWG–14–563, 2014 WL 7336678, at *3
(D. Md. Dec. 19, 2014) (identifying the trade secrets as “confidential business information, such as
customer lists, client contact information, contract terms, and pricing information” and alleging that
the information was “closely guarded as secret information by the plaintiff,” the employees who
received the information “each had a duty to maintain this information as secret,” and the “plaintiff
kept this information confidential at all times” were all sufficient); Events Media Network, Inc. v.
Weather Channel Interactive, Inc., Civil No. 1:13–03 (RBK/AMD), 2013 WL 3658823, at *4 (D. N.J.
July 12, 2013) (asserting that the license agreement with the defendant included a confidentiality
obligation and a reporting requirement for improper use of the database was sufficient to plead that
reasonable efforts were taken even though each individual who accessed the database was not
obligated to sign a confidentiality agreement).
69 See, e.g., MicroStrategy Servs. Corp. v. OpenRisk, LLC, No. 1:14cv1244 (JCC/IDD), 2015 WL
1221263, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 17, 2015) (failing to allege that the consultant who received the trade
secret information was under an express or implied obligation of confidentiality resulted in dismissal
of the claim).
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evidenced by agreement is preferred.70 However, where the trade secret owner fails to
allege that an agreement or other restriction was in place, the trade secret claim may
be dismissed.71 The next section looks at the plausibility requirement in relation to
the misappropriation claim.
V. PLEADING MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER THE DTSA
A. In General
After considering plausibility in pleading trade secret status, one must attempt to
satisfy this requirement for the misappropriation allegation. As the Twombly Court
noted, the plausibility requirement “simply calls for enough fact[s] to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim element].” 72
But, determining what constitutes “enough fact[s]” for misappropriation under the
DTSA may be difficult at the pleading stage. According to the DTSA, misappropriation
is defined as:
(A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (B)
disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who (i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the
trade secret; (ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know
that the knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a
person who had used improper means to acquire the trade secret; (II)
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy of
the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or (III) derived from or
through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain
the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or (iii) before
a material change of the position of the person, knew or had reason to know
that (I) the trade secret was a trade secret; and (II) knowledge of the trade
secret had been acquired by accident or mistake. 73
The DTSA definition is substantively consistent with that of the UTSA so, as with
trade secret status, UTSA law should be applicable to interpretation of the DTSA. 74
70 See, e.g., Shield Techs. Corp. v. Paradigm Positioning, LLC, 908 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (citing provisions from the plaintiff’s agreements with the defendant prohibiting him from
disclosing the plaintiff’s confidential information was sufficient to plead that reasonable measures
were taken to protect the secrecy of the information); Wilcox Indus. Corp. v. Hansen, 870 F. Supp. 2d
296, 310 (D. N.H. 2012) (indicating the plaintiff required employees exposed to the information to sign
confidentiality agreements as a condition of their employment and it outfitted its facilities that
contained confidential information with security systems that restricted access to specific employees
was sufficient to plead that reasonable efforts were taken).
71 See, e.g., MicroStrategy Servs. Corp., 2015 WL 1221263, at *7.
72 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
73 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5) (2016).
74 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).

[16:188 2017] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

200

Unfortunately, the comments to Section 1 of the UTSA do not provide much guidance
on interpretation of these sections; however, they do provide an explanation that can
be applied to DTSA’s Section 5(B)(iii). According to the comments, the accident or
mistake cannot have occurred from the claimant’s failure to exercise reasonable efforts
to protect the secrecy of its information necessary for trade secret status. 75
There is also no definition of either “use” or “disclosure” found in the DTSA or the
UTSA comments. However, the term “disclosure” can be given a standard dictionary
definition76, while the term “use” can be subject to a number of interpretations
depending on the federal court reviewing the case. For example, in the Fifth Circuit
“use” was initially defined as commercial use rather than just any type of use. 77
Specifically, commercial use was the use by which a person seeks to profit. 78 More
recently, however, the court used the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition to
expand the definition of use beyond “commercial use” to almost any use that harmed
the business owner or benefitted the alleged misappropriator.79
Federal case law applying state UTSAs can be instructive. To survive a motion
to dismiss, the trade secret owner must provide facts to support at least one of the
bases for the defendant’s wrongdoing.80 Without sufficient facts, the case may be
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
Disclosure is the “act of disclosing”, “revelation”, or “the impartation of that which is secret or
not fully understood.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (6th ed. 1990).
77 See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1205 (5th Cir. 1986)
(concluding that since the trade secret had not been put into commercial operation to produce a
product that could be used, no commercial use had occurred).
78 See, e.g., Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, LLP, 823 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (finding
the defendant used the plaintiff’s trade secret information in its own software programs).
79 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40, cmt. C (1995); Bohnsack v. Varco,
L.P., 668 F.3d 262, 279-280 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to find use by the defendant where the defendant’s act of filing a patent application to the plaintiff’s
trade secret information disclosed to the defendant in confidence was likely to result in injury to the
plaintiff trade secret owner under the Restatement definition); Terra Nova Sciences, LLC v. Joa Oil
and Gas Houston, LLC, 738 F. Supp. 2d 689, 696 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (concluding the plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged use of the trade secret since plaintiffs alleged the defendant incorporated the plaintiffs’
software algorithms into its own software, from which it derived profits).
80 See, e.g., DLC DermaCare LLC v. Castillo, No. CV–10–333–PHX–DGC, 2010 WL 5148073, *4
(D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2010) (alleging upon information and belief that after termination of the franchise
agreement and without consent, the defendant franchisees operated their competitive businesses
using the plaintiff’s marks, manuals, training materials and other confidential and proprietary
information was sufficient to plead misappropriation); Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. v. Rezente, No. CIV.
2:10–1704 WBS KJM, 2010 WL 5129293, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010) (alleging that one defendant
accessed the plaintiff’s customer information hours before his resignation and this defendant took
“massive amounts of records showing [plaintiff’s] account information for all or almost all of the
customers serviced by [plaintiff’s] Sacramento sales force” and alleging that a second defendant took
two customers of one of plaintiff’s employees to the competitor and also completed a transaction at the
competitor for a customer that she had been working with at plaintiff, and this second defendant made
six sales worth $100,000 for the competitor in the four to six weeks following her resignation from the
plaintiff, but made no sales in her last twelve weeks at plaintiff was sufficient to plead
misappropriation); BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1079 (D.
Haw. 2011) (alleging that the defendant solicited business from the plaintiff’s clients, used the
plaintiff’s proprietary information to solicit proposed funding, interfered with its contracts, breached
its nondisclosure with plaintiff, and disparaged plaintiff, even though the defendant argued that the
plaintiff did not explain how the defendant misappropriated the contact lists and know-how,
distinguish the defendant’s acts from the alleged misappropriation by others, or explain how the
75
76
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dismissed.81 There is however no requirement that the trade secret owner allege every
act supporting the alleged wrong-doing.82 Furthermore, when multiple acts are
alleged, the trade secret owner is not required to plead each act sufficiently in order to
survive a challenge as long as one act is sufficiently claimed. 83 In addition, the trade
secret owner is not required to allege every time and date when the acts occurred since
this information is generally in the hands of the opposing party. 84 Nevertheless, the

alleged misappropriation was ongoing and would continue in the future was sufficient to plead
misappropriation).
81 See, e.g., Ciena Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nachazel, Civil Action No. 09–cv–02845–MSK–MJW, 2010
WL 3489915, at *4 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2010) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim where (1) the complaint only stated that the plaintiff’s former employee and new
employer misappropriated, or threatened to misappropriate, the plaintiff’s trade secrets for the
purpose of using and exploiting the information, and (2) the former employee’s acquisition and
possession of the plaintiff’s trade secrets was not imputable to the new employer simply by
employment of the former employee in a management position); Accenture Global Servs. GMBH v.
Guidewire Software Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 654, 663 (D. Del. 2008) (granting the defendant’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim for trade secret misappropriation where (1) the plaintiff failed to
claim that the defendant acquired the trade secrets by improper means but stated only that the
defendant “somehow gained access” to plaintiff’s trade secrets in creating its software and services,
and (2) the plaintiff failed to claim that the defendant used or disclosed the plaintiff’s trade secret
information but only claimed that defendant “seemed” to develop its product surprisingly quickly in
plaintiff’s opinion); All Bus. Solutions, Inc. v. NationsLine, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 553, 558-559 (W.D.
Va. 2009) (concluding the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant ‘sought . . . to appropriate and
disclose the names of [plaintiff’s] customers, along with other [plaintiff] trade secrets and confidential
information’ was insufficient to state a claim for trade secret misappropriation without additional
facts).
82 See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co. v. AlphaPet Inc., Civ. Action No. 09–971–LPS–CJB, 2011 WL
5402767, at *9 (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2011) (concluding the plaintiff stated a plausible claim for relief even
though the plaintiff did not allege every act of wrongdoing where the plaintiff alleged that (1) the
former employees disclosed the plaintiff’s confidential and proprietary trade secret information to
defendant during the design, start-up or operation of the defendant’s manufacturing process, (2)
defendant obtained trade secret information and used the information without express or implied
consent from plaintiff, and (3) defendant improperly used information related to plaintiff’s technology
during the design, start-up and/or operation of its manufacturing process without express or implied
consent from plaintiff); Edgenet, Inc. v. GS1 AISBL, 742 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1028-1029 (E.D. Wis. 2010)
(finding the plaintiff sufficiently alleged misappropriation of both the Master Collection and
Spreadsheet, even though the plaintiff only alleged misappropriation of the Spreadsheet and failed to
allege misappropriation of the Master Collection, but alleged the Collection and Spreadsheet both
contained categories and since the defendants used the Spreadsheet categories it therefore followed
that the defendants used the categories from the Master Collection as well).
83 See, e.g., ATS Prods., Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass, Inc., No. C 13–02403 SI, 2013 WL 6086924,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013) (concluding the plaintiff sufficiently alleged misappropriation by
acquisition, but did not sufficiently allege misappropriation by use); Alliance Tech. Grp., LLC v.
Achieve 1, LLC, Civil Action No. 3:12CV701–HEH, 2013 WL 143500, at *6 (E.D. Va. Jan. 11, 2013)
(alleging the defendant had knowledge of the trade secrets, coupled with his alleged use of them was
sufficient to raise a reasonable inference of misappropriation).
84 See, e.g., Natural Miracles, Inc. v. Team Nat’l, Inc., Civil Action No. 09–cv–01379–WDM–
KMT, 2009 WL 3234386, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2009) (finding the plaintiff was not required to allege
when and how the unlawful disclosure occurred where the plaintiff had alleged that it developed a
unique product for the distributor and the distributor ultimately partnered with another
manufacturer to produce a nearly identical product, even using the same packaging as proposed by
the plaintiff).
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trade secret owner is required to allege more than simply the elements of
misappropriation to establish a cause of action.85
B. Improper Means
According to the misappropriation definition, three of the ways liability can be
established for misappropriation of trade secrets under the DTSA require that the
information be obtained by improper means.86 According to the DTSA, “improper
means (A) includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach
of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means; and (B)
does not include reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other lawful
means of acquisition.”87 Section (A) is consistent with the definition provided in the
UTSA, while Section (B) is specific to the DTSA definition. 88 However, there is support
for Section (B) found in the UTSA comments. “Proper means” is defined, in part, in
Section 1 of the UTSA comments to include both “discovery by independent invention”
as well as “by reverse engineering.”89 For the last phrase in the DTSA definition, “any
other lawful means of acquisition” presumably this would include the remaining
“proper means” indicated in the UTSA Section 1 comments, that is, discovery under
license, observation of the item in public use or display, or through published
literature.90
Federal case law applying state UTSAs can also be helpful for satisfying the
plausibility requirement under the DTSA. To survive a plausibility challenge to a
claim that the plaintiff’s trade secrets were acquired by improper means, the trade
secret owner has several options. It may be sufficient for the trade secret owner to
allege that the misappropriator took its confidential information without permission
and sent it to a third party.91 These cases did not require that the trade secret owner
85 See, e.g., StrikeForce Techs., Inc. v. WhiteSky, Inc., Civil Action No. 13–1895 (SRC), 2013 WL
3508835, at *8 (D. N.J. July 11, 2013); Exal Corp. v. Roeslein & Assocs., Inc., No. 4:12cv1830, 2013
WL 6843022, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2013) (alleging future use with only one general statement
about actual use by the defendant was insufficient to plead a cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation).
86 18 U.S.C. §§ 1839(5)(A), (5)(B)(i), and (5)(B)(ii)(I) (2016).
87 Id. § 1839(6).
88 “Improper means” is defined in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as “theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy or espionage through
electronic or other means.” See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538–39
(2005).
89 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Joshua David Mellberg LLC v. Will, 96 F. Supp. 3d 953, 965-966 (D. Ariz. 2015)
(asserting that the former employee illegally downloaded the plaintiff’s training and educational
videos, a third party had notified plaintiff that the former employee had approached them to launch
a program that mirrored the plaintiff’s program, clients and agents had received marketing regarding
the program, and the former employee launched websites very similar to the plaintiff’s websites was
sufficient to state a plausible claim for misappropriation); Modus LLC v. Encore Legal Solutions, Inc.,
No. CV–12–00699–PHX–JAT, 2013 WL 6628125, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2013) (alleging that former
employees copied the former employer’s script library, stored it on computers supplied by their new
employer, and used it for the benefit of their new employer was sufficient); Seneca Cos., Inc. v. Becker,
No. 4:15–cv–00035–JEG, 2015 WL 5783809, at *5 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 17, 2015) (alleging that the former
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identify by name each defendant when there were multiple defendants involved, but
sufficient information had to be provided to put the defendants on notice. 92 A trade
secret owner may be able to satisfy the plausibility requirement by showing that the
misappropriating party had access to the secret and both the secret information and
the defendant’s design shared similar features. 93 The defendant’s knowledge of the
trade secret alone is likely insufficient. 94
C. Confidential Relationship
A trade secret owner can establish a claim for trade secret misappropriation under
the DTSA in two additional ways. Both ways require the trade secret owner to show
that the trade secret was acquired from a person who had a duty to maintain the
secrecy of the information or limit its use. 95 In this instance, federal cases applying
state UTSAs are instructive because of the similarity of the UTSA provision to that of
the DTSA provision. For example, to allege a claim for breach of a confidential
employment relationship sufficiently, the trade secret owner should be prepared to
show that the employee had a duty to maintain secrecy of the trade secret
information.96 This duty to maintain secrecy can be evidenced by a written
employee took trade secret information from the plaintiff and gave it to a competitor was sufficient to
plead acquisition by improper means).
92 See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co. v. AlphaPet Inc., Civ. Action No. 09–971–LPS–CJB, 2011 WL
5402767, at *7-8 (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2011) (concluding that even though the plaintiff had not identified
by name the specific former employees who allegedly leaked the prohibited information, the totality
of information the plaintiff provided was sufficient to establish a plausible claim for trade secret
misappropriation, specifically the former employees were those (1) individuals who were transferred
from plaintiff to the defendants pursuant to agreement, who also (2) worked on the IntegRex™
technology in connection with the start-up of plaintiff’s South Carolina facility, and who also (3)
traveled to Alabama as part of the development of the defendants’ Alabama facility); AgJunction LLC
v. Agrian Inc., No. 14–CV–2069–DDC–KGS, 2014 WL 2557704, at *7 (D. Kan. June 6, 2014) (alleging
one identified employee defendant knowingly received trade secret information provided by each of
several employee defendants and the one identified employee defendant disclosed that information
was sufficient).
93 See, e.g., Apex Tool Grp., LLC v. DMTCO, LLC, No. 3:13–cv–372, 2014 WL 6748344, *15 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 25, 2014) (pleading that (1) the defendant former employees were given access to
confidential, trade secret, and proprietary information related to the plaintiff’s product line, (2) while
still employed the former employees formed a competing company, (3) the former employees acquired
plaintiff’s tools and did not return them, (4) the former employees set up manufacturing equipment
at the competing company and immediately put the plaintiff’s tools into production, (5) the defendant
competitor provided funding and other assistance for the competing company, and (6) representatives
of both the competing company and the defendant competitor represented to customers that their new
product line was identical to the plaintiff’s product line and encouraged customers to test the new
products to confirm it, was sufficient to establish a plausible claim that the defendant competitor knew
or should have known that the trade secrets used by defendant former employees were acquired by
improper means and through a breach of secrecy and/or the disclosure or use of another’s trade secret
without the other’s consent).
94 See, e.g., East West, LLC v. Rahman, 873 F. Supp. 2d 721, 735 (E.D. Va. 2012) (making
conclusory allegations that its former employee possessed knowledge of its customers and business
information was insufficient to plead trade secret misappropriation).
95 18 U.S.C. §§ 1839(B)(ii)(II), (III) (2016).
96 See, e.g., Telogis, Inc. v. InSight Mobile Data, Inc., No. PWG–14–563, 2014 WL 7336678, *4
(D. Md. Dec. 19, 2014) (providing that plaintiff’s employees “learned plaintiff’s confidential business
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employment or consultant agreement with a confidentiality provision. 97 A plausible
claim can also be made where the duty of confidentiality is implied from the
circumstances as well as by the relationship of the parties. 98
VI. DAMAGES
The last aspect to consider for a DTSA claim is damages. Under the DTSA,
remedies include an award for “(I) damages for actual loss caused by the
misappropriation of the trade secret; and (II) damages for any unjust enrichment
caused by the misappropriation of the trade secret that is not addressed in computing
damages for actual loss.”99 Again, this provision is substantively similar to the UTSA
damages provision, so the UTSA comments and federal case law applying state UTSAs
can be helpful.100 Federal cases applying state UTSAs based actual loss on profits lost
by the plaintiff or profits gained by the defendant.101 As an alternative to actual loss
damages, the DTSA provides “in lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the
damages caused by the misappropriation may be measured by imposition of liability
for a reasonable royalty for the misappropriator’s unauthorized disclosure or use of the
information, such as customer lists, client contact information, contract terms, and pricing
information that are trade secrets of plaintiff” while employed, they “knew or had reason to know that
these trade secrets were vital to the commercial success of plaintiff and were closely guarded as secret
information by plaintiff,” they “had a duty to maintain this information as secret,” and then
“disclos[ed] and us[ed] plaintiff’s trade secrets and other confidential business information for the
benefit of defendants” at defendants’ “request and insistence” was sufficient to plead
misappropriation); AWP, Inc. v. Commonwealth Excavating, Inc., Civil Action No. 5:13cv031, 2013
WL 3830500, at *6 (W.D. Va. July 24, 2013) (alleging circumstances indicating that the defendants
knew the acquisition of the trade secrets by the former employee was improper and that the former
employee had a duty to maintain the secrecy of the information was sufficient).
97 See, e.g., Wilcox Indus. Corp. v. Hansen, 870 F. Supp. 2d 296, 310 (D. N.H. 2012) (alleging that
the defendants gained knowledge of the trade secrets through their confidential relationships with
plaintiff, one through prior employment and the other through a consulting arrangement with the
plaintiff, and that both relationships gave rise to a duty to maintain secrecy particularly in light of
nondisclosure agreements signed in both relationships was sufficient to plead a breach of confidence);
Apex Tool Grp., LLC, 2014 WL 6748344, at *14 (attaching signed confidentiality agreements between
the defendants and the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest is sufficient to plead a confidential
relationship).
98 See, e.g., Vesta Corp. v. Amdocs Mgmt. Ltd., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1166 (D. Or. 2015) (claiming
that the plaintiff disclosed the trade secrets to the defendants during acquisition negotiations that
failed, the defendants used the secrets, without authorization, to bring a competing product to market
in an expedited timeframe, to determine what functionalities it should include and exclude, and to
price the product in a way to undercut the plaintiff’s price was sufficient); Radiator Express
Warehouse, Inc. v. Shie, 708 F. Supp. 2d 762, 768-769 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (finding the plaintiff
sufficiently pled that the employees were under a duty to maintain the secrecy of the information
provided and they breached that duty by disclosing plaintiff’s trade secrets to a third party where
there was an implicit agreement between the parties and the information was acquired during
negotiations to purchase a business).
99 18 U.S.C. § 836(b)(3)(B)(i) (2016).
100 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 634 (2005) (“Damages can
include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by
misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss.”).
101 See, e.g., ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Biamp Sys., 653 F.3d 1163, 1180 (10th Cir. 2011); Ice
Corp. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1261 (D. Kan. 2009).
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trade secret.”102 Like the actual loss provision, this provision is also substantively
similar to that of the UTSA definition permitting use of the UTSA comments and
federal UTSA law as persuasive authority. 103 According to federal cases applying state
UTSAs, this reasonable royalty is generally used in the absence of proof of unjust
enrichment.104
Satisfying the plausibility requirement for damages was more forgiving than for
trade secret status and misappropriation in federal cases applying state UTSAs.
Failing to plead the amount of harm or the mechanism of causation was not necessarily
harmful as long as the remaining elements were pled sufficiently. 105 Accordingly, a
general damages allegation such as “plaintiff has ‘sustained and will continue to
sustain in the future injuries and monetary damages in excess of’” a specified amount
should still satisfy the plausibility requirement.106 Nevertheless, merely alleging a
belief that future damages will occur was insufficient without an allegation of current
damages.107
In addition to actual damages, both exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are
recoverable under the DTSA. Exemplary damages can be awarded in an amount not
to exceed twice the damages award where willful and malicious misappropriation is
shown to exist.108 Furthermore, attorney’s fees may be awarded if willful and malicious
misappropriation exists or a motion to terminate an injunction is made in bad faith.109
Both the exemplary damages110 provision and the attorney’s fees111 provision are
substantively similar to those of the UTSA. Since pleading for these awards has not
18 U.S.C. § 836(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2016).
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 634 (2005) (“In lieu of
damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be measured
by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator’s unauthorized disclosure or
use of a trade secret.”).
104 See, e.g., Secure Energy, Inc. v. Coal Synthetics, LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 923, 931-932 (E.D. Mo.
2010); De Lage Landen Operational Servs., LLC v. Third Pillar Sys., Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 850, 854
(E.D. Pa. 2012).
105 See, e.g., Modus LLC v. Encore Legal Solutions, Inc., No. CV–12–00699–PHX–JAT, 2013 WL
6628125, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2013) (alleging that (1) it “sustained and will continue to sustain
actual and/or consequential damages in an amount to be determined at trial;” (2) its scripts were
developed at “substantial cost;” and (3) its scripts provided a “unique” interface to its customers was
sufficient); Fortinet Inc. v. FireEye Inc., Case No. 5:13–CV–02496–EJD, 2014 WL 4955087, *8 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 30, 2014) (concluding the plaintiff sufficiently alleged harm by alleging the existence of a
valuable trade secret, the improper use of that trade secret, the defendant’s interference with the
plaintiff’s potential economic advantage, and the defendant’s disruption of the business relationship
between the plaintiff and its customers and distributors); Mintel Learning Tech., Inc. v. Ambow Educ.
Holding Ltd., No. 5:11–CV–01504–EJD, 2012 WL 762126, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2012) (alleging the
existence of a valuable trade secret, its improper use by the defendant to improve its own competing
product, and some lost profits suffered as a result of the competition where the natural inference was
that the defendant’s product, once improved with the plaintiff’s trade secrets, competed more
effectively and won some of the plaintiff’s business justified denying the defendant’s motion to
dismiss).
106 See, e.g., Miami Valley Mobile Health Servs., Inc. v. ExamOne Worldwide, Inc., 852 F. Supp.
2d 925, 943 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
107 See, e.g., Dice Corp. v. Bold Techs., No. 11–13578, 2012 WL 263031, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Jan.
30, 2012).
108 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(C) (2016).
109 Id. § 1836(b)(3)(D).
110 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 634 (2005).
111 See id. § 4(ii)-(iii), 14 U.L.A. 642 (2005).
102
103
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typically been challenged with a motion to dismiss in federal cases applying state
UTSAs, they will not be discussed in detail in this article. 112
VII. CONCLUSION
While the first reaction to the new DTSA may be a sigh of relief that there is now
a federal civil trade secret misappropriation statute, an almost immediate secondary
response will be frustration over the federal plausibility requirement. An advantage
to this statute, however, is that there are extensive similarities between the definitions
of the DTSA and UTSA. Therefore, the use of the UTSA comments and federal cases
applying state UTSAs can provide a starting point for those attorneys navigating the
plausibility requirement for purposes of a DTSA claim. This approach will also provide
consistency to attorneys and the courts as the new law is applied.

112 See, e.g., Baker Hughes, Inc. v. S & S Chem., LLC, 63 F. Supp. 3d 762, 770 (W.D. Mich. 2014)
(denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss concerning both punitive damages and attorney fees,
where the defendants did not object to the plaintiff’s allegation that the misappropriation was willful
to support attorney fees nor was it clear which state’s law applied to the punitive damages claim).

